12 August 1976

	MEMORANDUM	FOR:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence			
	FROM	:	Cord Meyer, Jr.			
	SUBJECT	:	Review of Strategic Warning Staff and Support of It by Agency Elements			
	Assistant to the	DCI fo	est I have reviewed the functions of the Special or Strategic Warning and the Strategic Warning			
25X1	Stair. In the Co	urse or	this review I have consulted with			
25/1	Aganas which as		and the heads of those offices within the			
	Agency which support and work with SWS. My conclusions are as follows:					
	TOTTOMS:					
			EAL CIVE Day of the A			
	a. Adequacy of the SWS Basic Charter as Contained in					
	DCID 1/5 - There is general agreement that a small and					
	qualified staff, such as SWS, should be focused on the specific					
	problem of strategic warning defined as the threat of attack					
		by the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact, China and North Korea.				
	In spite of the unlikelihood of such an event we must afford					
	the luxury o	the luxury of a small and expert group with this responsi-				
	bility in vie	w of its	s importance to our over-all mission. The			
	location of t	he staf	if in the Pentagon has worked satisfactorily,			
25X1	as has		as Special Assistant to the DCI.			
	that it feels of the Agend from State h	it need by. On out the	All-Source Intelligence in the Strategic The staff has access to all the information Its from DIA, NSA and from the components the gap is the unavailability of NODIS traffic tree is no solution to this problem other than are doing with the top levels at State.			
			l l			

25)

25)

SECRET

- c. <u>Publications</u> The monthly SWS Report and the weekly Alert List show that the staff is alert to new developments and techniques in the strategic warning field and the publications seem to be well received and responded to by customers both in the military and in the Agency.
- d. Periodic Review of SWS by the Strategic Warning
 Review Group Periodic review is called for by DCID 1/5 and
 the most recent review was conducted 11 June 1976, copy attached.
 I have found nothing to cause me to disagree with its findings.
- 2. Suggestions were made for additional activity by SWS. The Director of OCI admits that over time there may have been some atrophy in the sense of responsibility for strategic warning by the analysts and he would welcome the assistance of the Director of SWS in a seminar or series of briefings bringing them up to date on developments in this field. In addition the Acting Deputy Director of OSR suggested that the Director of SWS might be more active in seeking input from the Community and stated that OSR would be glad to contribute studies on specific issues in the strategic warning field.

	3. Statting Problem - DCID 1/5 states in general terms that the			
	members of NFIB will "provide full-time senior professional intelligence			
	personnel" to the SWS, but there seems to be no other formal document			
	defining the over-all size of the staff or requiring NFIB members to			
	provide a specified number of people at a particular grade.	25		
25X1	first Director of SWS, agreed to the need			
25X1	for a professional staff of analysts in addition to the Director. This			
	number reflected a desire to have broad community representation,			
	but to stay within the general requirement that the staff be kept small.			
	<u> </u>			
25X1	The plan was to have representatives from CIA, DIA and NSA,			
0574	andfrom State and each of the Services. In the 18 months of its			
25X1	existence, the SWS has operated with analysts on duty.	25		
	At present, the on-board complement in addition to the Director is:			
	DIA	25		
	DIA	_`		
	NSA			
	CTA .			

Air Force

*Serves as Deputy Director of SWS

In addition the Army has designated an 0-4 who will report on 13 September and the Marine Corps has volunteered to assign an officer. Both Navy and State remain reluctant to participate.

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to the establishment of slots under the DCI for the SWS.

Cord Meyer, Jr.

Attachment: As stated

25X1

25X1